Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender criminal defendants who spill the beans to their same-gender spouses are not the only citizens affected by a state's refusal to apply marital privileges to same-sex spouses. In fact, every same-sex spouse in the United States is adversely affected by the application of laws refusing to recognize the validity of a same-sex marriage celebrated in another state to deny them marital privileges.
13 This is because the risk of denial of an evidentiary privilege in one state would have a chilling effect on the behavior the privilege is intended to protect in the state celebrating the marriage.
14 The lack of certainty over whether the marital privileges will be applied across state lines would prevent one same-sex spouse in certain circumstances from openly communicating with the other for fear that such communications will be revealed in court. 15 Thus, the privilege protected in one state is defeated in the next. 16 And the behavior protected by the privilege in one state will be curtailed for fear of compelled testimony in another state. 17 Essentially, one state's laws refusing to recognize valid same-sex marriages have the effect of partially invalidating the laws of another state celebrating marriage equality.
18
With the number of states celebrating same-sex marriage growing almost monthly, 19 the number of those affected by the denial of marital privileges continues to grow exponentially. Many states, however, continue to support their statutes and constitutional amendments reaffirming their rights to refuse to recognize as valid a same-sex marriage obtained validly in another state. 20 Kentucky's mini-DOMA, The reality that the Supreme Court has struck § 3 as unconstitutional while § 2 persists creates a tension that has not yet been resolved.
This article explores the impact of § 2 of DOMA and mini-DOMAs on the actions of same-sex spouses in their home states, which would be protected from disclosure in those states, but which may be ordered revealed by a foreign court with a mini-DOMA. 24 For example, it will explore how a mini-DOMA in Texas may inhibit the lawful and protected actions of same-sex spouses in New York, and why that result defeats the intent of lawmakers in New York. 25 Part II presents an , defendants in Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014 ), aff'd, Bostic v. Schaefer, Nos. 14-1167 , 14-1169 , 14-1173 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. Jul. 28, 2014 , filed an appeal from order striking Virginia's mini-DOMA as unconstitutional, in which the Fourth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court's ruling that the mini-DOMA was unconstitutional); Joseph Lord, Kentucky Gov. Steve Beshear to Appeal Federal Judge's Same-Sex Marriage Order, WFPL NEWS (Mar. 4, 2014, 11:00 AM) , http://wfpl.org/post/kentucky-gov-steve-beshear-appeal-federal-judgessame-sex-marriage-order (reporting that Kentucky governor intends to appeal from the decision in Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Ky. 2014 ) striking Kentucky's mini-DOMA as unconstitutional); Oklahoma: Bishop v. Smith, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedom tomarry.org/litigation/entry/oklahoma (last visited Sept. 20, 2014 ) (reporting that Oklahoma filed an appeal on January 16, 2014, from the decision in Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014 ), aff'd, Bishop v. Smith, Nos. 14-5003, 14-5006, 2014 WL 3537847 (10th Cir. 2014 ) striking Oklahoma's mini-DOMA as unconstitutional); Utah: Kitchen v. Herbert, FREEDOM TO MARRY , http://www.freedomtomarry.org/litigation/entry/utah (last visited Sept. 20, 2014) (reporting that Utah appealed from order striking Utah's mini-DOMA as unconstitutional in Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013 ), aff'd, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014 Next, Part III explains marital privileges generally, focusing on the confidential marital communications privilege, the spousal testimony privilege, and the role of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 in applying those privileges. 27 Part IV addresses the applicability of marital privileges in federal court since the Supreme Court's 2013 decision in United States v. Windsor. 28 Part V assesses the inequality of the marital privileges afforded to same-sex couples when compared to opposite-sex couples under § 2 of DOMA, as well as mini-DOMAs. 29 Part VI suggests the options available to correct the disparities between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples in exercising the benefits associated with marital privileges, including a uniform marital privilege and intervention by the Supreme Court.
30
Part VI includes an explanation and assessment of available constitutional arguments challenging DOMA § 2 and mini-DOMAs, including equal protection, substantive due process, and comity. 31 Finally, Part VII concludes that the unequal application of marital privileges to same-sex spouses renders DOMA § 2 and states' mini-DOMAs unconstitutional, requiring action from the Supreme Court to ensure the uniformity needed to allow samesex spouses to fully enjoy the benefits of marriage conferred upon them by the laws of the state of their marriage celebration. 32 
II. A GROWING POPULATION
The state of same-sex marriages has changed drastically since the demise of § 3 of the federal DOMA, which limited the federal definition of marriage to one man and one woman, in the now infamous 2013 case of United States v. Windsor. 33 But long before Edith Windsor had her day in court, the United States was facing a turn in the way individuals viewed the fundamental right to marry. One of the first cases dealing with same-sex couples' right to marry, Baker v. Nelson Ct. 2675 (2013 ). 34. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971 ), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972 .
unceremonious dismissal by the Supreme Court, 35 which has been long cited by both those in opposition and support of same-sex marriages. 36 In 1971, Richard John Baker and James Michael McConnell, a gay couple, applied to a court clerk in Minneapolis, Minnesota, for a marriage license. 37 The couple was turned away because state law limited marriages to persons of the opposite sex. 38 The couple argued that the United States Constitution protected a fundamental right to marry. 39 A judge in Minnesota disagreed with the couple and instead concluded that the clerk was not required to issue a marriage license to the couple. 40 The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld that ruling, asserting that "marriage [i]s a union of man and woman" in an institution "as old as the book of Genesis." 41 Most notably, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with this one-sentence order: "The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question." 42 In stark contrast to 1971, today some same-sex couples enjoy explicit rights and protections in a growing number of states. Unfortunately, there is no hard or fast rule governing the extent of rights enjoyed by same-sex couples; some states allow same-sex couples rights equal to heterosexual couples to marry, while others allow more limited recognition of same-sex marriages. 43 Twenty states and the District of Columbia recognize same sex marriages, 44 one state recognizes civil 35 . See Baker, 409 U.S. at 810. 36. Lyle Denniston, Gay Marriage and Baker v. Nelson, SCOTUSBLOG (July 4, 2012, 4:52 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/gay-marriage-and-baker-v-nelson/ ("The precedent is considered to be fully binding even now by opponents of same-sex marriage, but of only limited impact-at most-by advocates of such marriages."). 37. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 185. 38. Id. 39. Id. at 186. 40. Id. at 185. 41. Id. at 186. 42. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972 Sept. 8, 2014); Indiana, Baskin v. Bogan, No. 1:14-cv-00355-RLY-TAB1:14-cv-00404-RLY-TAB, 1:14-cv-00406-RLY-MJD, 2014 WL 2884868 (S.D. Ind. June 25, 2014 ), aff'd, Nos. 14-2386 , 14-2387 , 14-2388 , 14-2526 WL 4359059 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014 (pending appeal to the United States Supreme Court); Kentucky, Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-CV-750-H, 2014 WL 556729 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014 Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014 ) (Tenth Circuit affirmed Utah district court's invalidation of same-sex marriage ban pending disposition of writ of certiorari); Wisconsin, Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-cv-64-bbc, 2014 WL 2693963 (W.D. Wis. June 13, 2014 ), aff'd, Baskin, 2014 WL 4359059 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014 (pending appeal to the United States Supreme Court).
of Tennessee issued an injunction against the state's ban on same-sex marriage to recognize the marriages of three same-sex couples validly married in states that celebrate same-sex marriages.
48 Judge Aleta A. Trauger noted in her order that, "[a]t this point, all signs indicate that, in the eyes of the United States Constitution, the plaintiffs' marriages will be placed on an equal footing with those of heterosexual couples and that proscriptions against same-sex marriage will soon become a footnote in the annals of American history."
49 While this historical injunction is not unique, it does draw the question of what rights legally married individuals of one state will receive in another that might not recognize their marriage.
While it does seem inevitable at this point that the Supreme Court will eventually take action to mandate marriage equality, the issue of marriage inequity remains pertinent because the Court has already "ducked the issue" of the constitutionality of § 2 of DOMA in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 50 and Justice Sotomayor has "indicated she might prefer to let the question of state gay marriage laws 'perk' for a while longer in the lower courts."
51 Because universal marriage equality may be years off, the discussion of the implications of non-uniform state laws on same-sex marriage post-Windsor remains relevant.
52
III. MARITAL PRIVILEGES All state and federal courts recognize a marital privilege in one form or another. 53 These privileges are reserved to those who have either currently or previously entered into a valid marriage. 54 As evidenced in 48. Tanco, 2014 WL 997525, at *9 (order granting preliminary injunction Evidentiary rules are constructed to aid the fact finder in discovering the truth. 56 Privileges are antithetical to this endeavor. Specifically, privileges protect from disclosure relevant, otherwise admissible evidence that may bring a jury closer to the truth. 57 The purpose of obstructing that search for the truth with an evidentiary privilege is to protect some other public interest deemed more important than the discovery of the truth. 58 Thus, for a variety of public policy reasons, a number of evidentiary privileges have evolved, including marital privileges. There are two marital privileges and they both focus on protecting the relationship between spouses: the spousal testimony privilege and the confidential marital communications privilege.
59
Both marital privileges require a valid marriage as a pre-requisite to their application. See, e.g., Knox, 124 F.3d at 1365; Acker, 52 F.3d at 515; Lustig, 555 F.2d at 747 (citing United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Neeley, 475 F.2d 1136 , 1137 (4th Cir. 1973 v. Hamilton, 19 F.3d 350, 354 (7th Cir. 1994) ). See also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) ("[privileges] must be strictly construed"). In Acker, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the refusal of the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina to recognize defendant Catherine Acker's assertion of either the spousal testimony privilege or the confidential marital communications privilege. 52 F.3d at 515. In that case, Acker was convicted of bank robbery after Samuel Holly, the man with whom Acker had cohabitated for twenty-five years prior to her conviction, testified against her as part of his own plea agreement. Id. at 512. Acker's assertion of the marital privileges was based on her argument that the court should recognize their common law marriage. Id. at 514. The Fourth Circuit looked first to the laws of New York and North Carolina, the only states in which the couple resided throughout their relationship. Id. Because neither state recognized common law marriage, the court determined that Acker and Holly were not validly married. Id. at 514-15. The court denied Acker's argument that it should look to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to extend to her common law marriage "the same policies of preserving marital harmony and protecting the intimate nature of marital communications are generally seen to outweigh the consequence of excluding otherwise admissible evidence from the fact finder.
62 Because the confidential marital communications privilege and the spousal testimony privilege protect a public policy viewed to outweigh even a court's search for the truth, these privileges are rather significant.
A. The Confidential Marital Communications Privilege
All state and federal jurisdictions in the United States recognize the confidential marital communications privilege in some form.
63
This privilege protects from disclosure intimately shared communications rights and privileges that are extended to married individuals in federal courts." Id. at 514. The court continued that "reason dictates that before the courts extend a marital privilege to benefit a defendant, the defendant must have assumed both the privileges and responsibilities of a valid marriage under the law of the state in which the privilege is asserted." Id. at 515. Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit looked to the laws of the state in which the privilege was asserted as well as the laws of the states in which the couple had resided throughout the entirety of their relationship. 67 Essentially, it enables married couples to discuss everything from dirty laundry to pillow talk without fear that such conversations will later become public. To ensure the ongoing maintenance of such confidentiality, it may be asserted by either spouse to prevent even a willing spouse-witness from testifying adversely to the party-spouse's interests. 68 The public policy behind the confidential marital communications privilege is to preserve the intimacy of marital communications. 69 In Stein v. Bowman, the United States Supreme Court explained the significance of the privilege in federal common law as follows: "To break down or impair the great principles which protect the sanctities of husband and wife, would be to destroy the best solace of human existence."
70 So important is this policy that the confidential marital communications privilege even survives the termination of the marriage. 71 This privilege makes certain one's ability to relieve herself from her burdens in the moment, knowing they will remain private even if the marriage later fails.
The In Wolfle, the Supreme Court further explained that the existence of the confidential marital communications privilege should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
75
All fifty states and the District of Columbia recognize the confidential marital communications privilege in some form, 76 even if those states may not also recognize the spousal immunity privilege.
77
Those states that recognize confidential marital communications but not spousal immunity reason that the purpose of preserving marital harmony is sufficiently served through the former; the latter being viewed as an unnecessary extension and perhaps an unnecessary obstruction to the truth. The spousal testimony privilege allows a spouse with information sought for disclosure at trial to invoke the privilege to avoid testifying adversely to his or her spouse altogether on any subject at any time for the duration of the marriage.
87 This "privilege is vested in the witness-spouse, who may neither be compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying." 88 The spousal testimony privilege "is what remains of the old common law rule that a spouse was incompetent as a witness for or against the other spouse based on the legal fiction that husband and wife were one person. Cir. 1961 Cir. ), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 952 (1962 ). See also Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44 (discussing the origins of marital privilege). In Lustig, the Ninth Circuit heard the appeal of defendant George Lustig from his conviction on various federal drug charges. 555 F.2d at 742. He challenged the refusal of the District of Alaska to recognize either the spousal testimony privilege or the confidential marital communications privilege to prevent his common law wife of seven years, Callie Newton, from testifying. Id. at 747. The court looked to the law of the State of Alaska to determine the validity of their marriage; Alaska was both the state of their shared residence and the state in which the privilege was asserted. Id. at 747-48. The Ninth Circuit assumed the existence of a common law marriage because the pair lived together for seven years, had two children, and held themselves out as husband and wife. Id. at 747 n. 11. Because Alaska did not recognize common law marriage, however, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court. Id. at 748. The Ninth Circuit declined to address whether the district court was compelled by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to recognize the common law marriage, noting that neither privilege would apply if recognized; the spousal testimony privilege would not apply because the relationship ended prior to Newton's testimony and the confidential marital communications privilege did not apply because "Newton's testimony concerned matters neither communicative nor confidential in nature." Id. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63
husband was tantamount to self-incrimination.
90
Fortunately, that explanation has evolved.
The public policy sustaining the privilege today is the maintenance of marital harmony.
91
It is quite obvious that forcing an unwilling witness to testify adversely to his or her spouse in an otherwise healthy marriage could irreparably damage that relationship. The spousal testimony privilege prevents such forced testimony from an unwilling spouse, but does not prevent a willing spouse from testifying-in which case, "their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve." 92 Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia recognize a testimonial privilege for spouses. 93 Of those, fifteen include language specific to heterosexual couples, 94 while sixteen use gender neutral language that could be easily applied to same-sex couples if those jurisdictions recognized marriage equality. 95 Federal common law on the spousal testimony privilege limits its application to criminal cases. 96 Thus, the spousal testimony privilege is more limited in its application than the confidential marital communications privilege. 
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C. FRE 501
The Federal Rules of Evidence are soft-spoken on all privileges, including marital privileges, to say the least. When the United States Supreme Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1972, it expressly included the spousal testimony privilege, among others.
97
Because the promulgated rules omitted a number of other privileges, including the confidential marital communications privilege and the physician-patient privilege, Congress balked at the proposed rules governing privileges. 98 Questions were raised as to why the spousal testimony privilege was preferred over the confidential marital communications privilege. 99 After years of Congressional Hearings and debate on the broader issue of privilege, Congress rejected a codification of specific privileges, instead favoring a broad provision placing discretion on the common law to continue the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges.
100
There is no codified federal marital privilege. Instead, under the Federal Rules, a federal court applying a marital privilege must first look to Federal Rule of Evidence 501. Rule 501 instructs federal courts to apply the privilege laws of the state supplying the rules of decision in a diversity case, or to apply the federal common law on privileges in a case in which federal substantive law applies. 101 Its purpose is to "provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis."
102
In sum, all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and federal common law recognize the confidential marital communications privilege, 103 while a majority of states, the District of Columbia, and federal common law also recognize the spousal testimony privilege. 
A. The History of DOMA and Mini-DOMAs
To understand the purposes behind the federal DOMA and its state counterparts-as is required for any constitutional analysis concerning these laws-one must become familiar with the progression of same-sex marriage laws prior to 1996. In the early 1970s, plaintiffs brought a few constitutional challenges demanding that state officials issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 113 In each case, the court ruled that a In response to Baehr, the United States Congress enacted DOMA and many states enacted similar mini-DOMAs to "defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage" from expansion to include same-sex partnerships.
116 DOMA contains two key provisions. In § 2, DOMA states that:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
117
Section 3 provides:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. Nos. 14-2386 , 14-2387 , 14-2388 , 14-2526 WL 4359059 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014 
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The definitional provision of DOMA- § 3-applied to well over 1,000 Acts of Congress and countless other administrative rulings, regulations, and findings. 134 The Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly Rule 501 governing privileges, were enacted by Congress in 1975. 135 They appear after Title 28 in the United States Code and are clearly "Acts of Congress" subject to § 3 of DOMA. Although neither the term "marriage" nor "spouse" appears in the text of Rule 501, 136 DOMA would have had a significant role in its application prior to Windsor.
To determine the applicability of a marital privilege in federal court before or after Windsor, a federal district court would first have to determine whether the jurisdiction recognizes the claimed privilege. This analysis differs depending on whether state or federal law provides the rule of decision in the case. 137 Rule 501 explicitly directs federal courts sitting in diversity to apply state law to determine if a marital or other privilege applies. 138 In a federal question case, however, federal courts look to federal common law to determine if a privilege applies.
139
Once a federal court has determined that a privilege exists under either an applicable state law or federal common law, it must determine that there exists or existed a valid marriage on which a marital privilege can rest. 140 The law of marriage is reserved to the states; 141 thus, "there is 134. See Letter from Danya K. Shaw, Associate General Counsel, to the U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf (citation omitted) ("In 1997, we issued a report identifying 1,049 federal statutory provisions classified to the United States Code in which benefits, rights, and privileges are contingent on marital status or in which marital status is a factor.").
135 Cir. 1997) . In United States v. Knox, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the confidential marital communications privilege did not apply to prevent the testimony of Robyn Cartwright, the ex-wife of defendant Michael Knox. Id. Ms. Cartwright testified that she and the defendant had divorced in September 1991, prior to the October 17, 1991 incident leading to his arrest. Id. The defendant provided no evidence that any communications relayed by Ms. Cartwright occurred prior to October 17. Id. After explaining that federal courts must look to state law to determine the existence of a marital privilege in federal court, however, the Tenth Circuit summarily decided that the privilege did not apply in this case, without citing any state law on the subject. Id. The choice of law issue of which state's law to apply was ignored. Id. Federal common law recognizes both the spousal testimony privilege and the confidential marital communications privilege. See Bergstrom & Denvil, supra note 1, at 229-30 (internal citations omitted) ("Common law provides for both federal spousal privileges and shows that the two privileges share the similar purpose of protecting marriages.").
140. Under DOMA § 3, before Windsor was decided, a federal court considering the validity of a marriage under the laws of a state that recognizes same-sex marriage, whether celebrated within the state or elsewhere, would have been faced with the additional challenge of determining if the definitional language of DOMA prevented the court from applying the state law in contravention of DOMA. Although no federal court ever faced this issue, it is conceivable that it would have taken one of two approaches. On one hand, a federal court could have determined that § 3 of DOMA prevented it from applying the state law definition of a valid marriage where that marriage was between members of the same gender. Alternatively, a federal court considering this question under DOMA § 3 could have reasoned that, because the terms "marriage" and "spouse" are not used in the Act of Congress itself (Rule 501), but in a state law defining a valid marriage, the court would not have been bound to apply the definitions of DOMA and could recognize a marital privilege between same-sex spouses.
143
For example, although Edith Windsor never asserted the confidential marital communications privilege in her federal question case, 144 had she attempted to, the district court would have had to look to state law to determine if Windsor and Spyer's marriage was valid. Assume for the sake of argument that New York State law was the only option on which the district court could rely. A New York court would have recognized the validity of the marriage obtained lawfully in Canada. 145 A district court looking to New York law would reach the same conclusion-until it ran into DOMA. Would the district court be required to apply DOMA (1975) NO. 104-644, at 31, 18 (1996) ) ("Under DOMA, the question of whether 'benefits available to married couples under state law will be available to homosexual couples is purely a matter of state law . . . [DOMA] in no way affects that question.' Rather than usurping a state's authority to determine whether to provide state marital benefits to same-sex couples, DOMA was intended to restrict the availability of federal marital benefits only to heterosexual couples.").
144. Because the marriage had ended, Windsor could not have asserted the spousal testimony privilege in this hypothetical. See supra text accompanying note 87. See also Roberts, supra note 54, at 1.
145. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 Ct. , 2683 Ct. (2013 . § 3 to invalidate the marriage for privilege purposes in federal court or would the court find DOMA inapplicable to the New York State definition of "marriage" or "spouse"? No federal court ever faced that question during the 17-year tenure of DOMA § 3.
Fortunately, post-Windsor, no court will ever have to answer that question because there no longer exists any federal definition of marriage in conflict with any state's definition of marriage. A valid marriage under current law will always be subject to a state law definition of marriage. Determining which state's law to apply, however, complicates matters tremendously.
C. Choice of Law
Determining which state's law to apply to determine the validity of a marriage even after Windsor is a complex question, whether the federal court is addressing a federal question or sitting in diversity. Not since the anti-miscegenation laws struck down in Loving v. Virginia 146 has there been a greater divide among states over what constitutes a valid marriage.
147
This opens the possibility of a federal court having to choose between the laws of a state that recognizes same-sex marriage and a state that affirmatively refuses to recognize such relationships in determining whether to recognize a marital privilege.
For example, imagine the case of a same-sex couple married and residing in New York who, two years later, travels through Texas, which maintains a mini-DOMA. While in Texas, the couple is involved in a car accident with a Texas citizen. In a Texas federal court, one spouse-the driver-is sued for damages related to the car accident. At trial, the plaintiff wishes to call the defendant's spouse to question him about communications the defendant spouse made to him in confidence in New York after they had returned from their travels. The defendant asserts the confidential marital communications privilege. The Texas district court must determine whether to recognize such a privilege. To do so, it must apply state law-but which one?
Choice of law issues could arise at two points in the analysis of whether a marital privilege will apply. This first area of conflict exists where two different states interested in the same case have conflicting laws as to the existence of a privilege; for example, if one state 146. 388 U.S. 1 (1967 LAWS § 139 & cmt. d (1971) ). Courts recognize an exception to this general rule where the state with the most significant relationship with the communication recognizes a marital privilege that the forum state does not and the party asserting the privilege demonstrates a "special reason why the forum policy favoring admission should not be given effect." Id. at 238-39 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 139(2). A trial court should weigh four factors to determine if "special reasons" exist: "(1) the number and nature of the contacts that the state of the forum has with the parties and with the transaction involved, (2) the relative materiality of the evidence that is sought to be excluded, (3) the kind of privilege involved and (4) fairness to the parties." Id. at 239 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 139(2) cmt. d. Courts recognize an additional exception to the general rule admitting evidence in light of a conflict of laws concerning the recognition of a marital privilege: "when admitting the evidence would be 'contrary to the strong public policy of the forum.'" Id. at 239 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 139(1). Given the strong debate on this issue, one can imagine that a state wishing to recognize a valid same-sex marriage would argue that a strong public policy against discrimination would trigger such an exception. Likewise, a state refusing to recognize same-sex marriage would argue that strong public policies behind encouraging committed opposite-sex marriages, maintaining the traditional definition of marriage, and promoting procreation within the confines of marriage would also trigger the exception. In either case, the situation remains that a privilege recognized in one state may not be recognized in another state.
150. Id. at 237-38. 151 . Id. at 240 (internal citations omitted).
provides that states need not recognize a valid marriage celebrated elsewhere, states are not bound to honor the marriages performed by other states under current law. 152 With so many states divided over the issue of marriage equality, the risk of these definitions conflicting is on the rise.
V. A LESSER PRIVILEGE?
As explained above, a state with a mini-DOMA need not recognize a same-sex marriage celebrated in another state as valid because § 2 of DOMA federally protects states in curtailing those rights.
153 Without a valid marriage, the courts in those states with mini-DOMAs will not recognize either marital privilege in their courts when asserted by a same-sex spouse. 154 This reality may have a chilling effect on same-sex spouses in how they communicate even while present in the state which celebrated their marriage. Because "an uncertain privilege . . . is little better than no privilege at all,"
155 the mini-DOMAs in effect in states other than that in which the same-sex spouses were married essentially prevent those spouses from exercising the rights and privileges afforded them by the state recognizing their marriage. For example, Texas's mini-DOMA may prevent a same-sex couple legally married and residing in New York from communicating freely within New York despite the fact that New York intended to afford same-sex couples all the rights and privileges of marriage, including marital privileges. 156 In that light, it seems that voters in Texas have devalued the rights of New York citizens, creating an inequality unintended by New York law.
A. Section 2 of DOMA and Mini-DOMAs
While the Supreme Court struck § 3 of DOMA in United States v. Windsor, 157 that decision had no effect on § 2, which remains a valid statute. In § 2, DOMA states: See, e.g., Tanco v. Haslam, No. 3:13-CV-01159, 2014 WL 997525 , at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014) (granting preliminary injunction preventing State of Tennessee from denying validity of three same-sex marriages validly celebrated out-of-state).
161. See, e.g., Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014 ), aff'd, Bostic v. Shaefer, Nos. 14-1167 , 14-1169 , 14-1173 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. 2014 The purpose of this "place of celebration rule" is to provide to the couple predictability about their rights and obligations within the marriage.
166
Mini-DOMAs, however, invoke the "public policy exception" to this place of celebration rule to abandon comity, upending validly celebrated marriages in contravention of the public policy to sustain marriages.
167
B. An Uncertain Privilege
The Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor took issue with the fact that § 3 of DOMA sought "to injure the very class New York [sought] to protect." 168 The Court noted that, "[a]fter a statewide deliberative process that enabled its citizens to discuss and weigh arguments for and against same-sex marriage, New York acted to enlarge the definition of marriage to correct what its citizens and elected representatives perceived to be an injustice that they had not earlier known or understood. Ct. 2675 Ct. , 2693 Ct. (2013 . "When New York adopted a law to permit same-sex marriage, it sought to eliminate inequality; but DOMA frustrates that objective through a system-wide enactment with no identified connection to any particular area of federal law." Id. 172. The two situations are, however, distinguishable in that states are vested with the power to define marriage. See id. at 2692 (2013) (noting states' power to define marriage and the significance of that power). In the example here, we have one state's expansion of marriage abridged by another state's limitation on marriage. This is arguably different from the situation of the federal government overreaching into the law of marriage to create a body of law at odds with the expansive definition of marriage one state, fully entitled to define marriage, has adopted. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 spouses lawfully bestowed upon them by a state that intended such rights and privileges to be realized. Returning to the example above, Texas's mini-DOMA limits the exercise of a privilege in New York by New Yorkers, despite the fact that New York intended the New York couple to have unlimited access to the benefits which accompany the marital privileges. The New Yorkers cannot fully embrace "the best solace of human existence" 173 -the intimate exchange of communications with a spouse-in New York, for fear that the privilege will not be recognized in any state with a mini-DOMA.
174 This is because the New York couple cannot foresee whether either or both spouses will ever be involved in criminal or civil litigation in any one of those states. Without knowing the communications will be protected, the policy behind the privilege is defeated; "[a]n uncertain privilege . . . is little better than no privilege at all." Any damage to a marriage relationship caused by one spouse testifying against the other would seem to flow from one doing damage to the other, not from one disclosing communications of the other.") This is a logical argument. If courts or legislators, however, believed it to be true, there would be no need for a marital communications privilege in any case. The need for such a privilege, or lack thereof, is beyond the scope of this article. Logical arguments to the contrary aside, I will proceed from the assumption that there exists some positive effect of the marital communications privilege in encouraging intra-marital communications sufficient to justify recognition of such a privilege in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.
175. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) . 176. See, e.g., id . at 393 ("An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all."); Grace M. 
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privilege has no value because no one can know that a communication is privileged when that communication occurs." 177 If an individual doubts that a confidence will be maintained and protected by a court, then he or she is significantly less like to share communications of consequence.
178
Because the purpose of the confidential marital communications privilege is to encourage spouses to seek out the comforts of their partners concerning the most significant subjects in their lives, 179 uncertainty in the maintenance of such confidences would serve to frustrate that goal.
VI. OPTIONS FOR RESTORING CERTAINTY TO MARITAL PRIVILEGES
As explained above, the only way to ensure that same-sex married citizens may fully enjoy the rights and benefits of marriage within states where their marriages are recognized-including the intimate sharing of confidential communications between spouses-is to ensure that their marriage would be deemed valid by all other states-even those with mini-DOMAs. 180 Until those individuals can predict that their marriages will be recognized as valid in all fifty states, they should assume that no marital privilege will apply to them in a state with a mini-DOMA, even to protect communications made and marriages celebrated out-of-state.
181
Without uniform marital privileges, the relationships and communications the recognizing state intended to promote and maintain will instead be inhibited by the laws of other jurisdictions.
182
To effectuate the intent of those jurisdictions which do extend marital privileges to same-sex spouses, one of two options is needed. REV. 1605 REV. , 1609 REV. -17 (1986 ) ("Continuing uncertainty exacts a high price. Fear of waiver in general is very expensive to both the participants and the legal system itself.").
177. Giesel, supra note 176, at 551 (citations omitted). 178. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391-93 (stating that uncertainty of privilege applicability will have the effect of decreasing communication between persons who are unsure of whether their communications will be privileged).
179. See Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 223 (1839) ("This rule is founded upon the deepest and soundest principles of our nature. Principles which have grown out of those domestic relations, that constitute the basis of civil society; and which are essential to the enjoyment of that confidence which should subsist between those who are connected by the nearest and dearest relations of life. To break down or impair the great principles which protect the sanctities of husband and wife, would be to destroy the best solace of human existence.").
180. First, a uniform marital privilege would provide the predictability needed to enable same-sex couples fostering a family relationship and communications in a state that recognizes their full marital rights to maintain that relationship and strengthen those communications. Second, a ruling from the Supreme Court of the United States that both DOMA and mini-DOMAs are unconstitutional would require states not currently recognizing valid same-sex marriages to do so; in a court's analysis of whether to apply a marital privilege, the conclusion that a valid marriage exists will lead the court to recognize the privilege where it is otherwise available.
A. A Uniform Privilege?
The first option-a uniform marital privilege-is not a viable solution. Of course, the Supreme Court could promulgate a Federal Rule of Evidence concerning marital privileges. Unfortunately, they tried that in 1972 and Congress then spent three years debating the federal law on privileges before scrapping all rules on privilege in favor of allowing federal common law to govern privileges where federal law provides the rules of decision, and requiring federal courts to apply state law on privileges where state law otherwise applies to the case. 183 Interestingly, the privilege the Court advanced in 1972 was the spousal immunity privilege; the Court intentionally omitted the confidential marital communications privilege.
184
Today, not only would our modern Congress have to agree on the extent of the marital privileges covered under a federal rule, they would have to agree to extend it to same-sex couples. Given the divided state of our Congress, it seems highly unlikely that such a scenario could ever play out in the near future.
Besides, a federal rule on privileges would apply only in federal court; to achieve the uniformity needed concerning the recognition of marital privileges to same-sex couples, federal and state courts would all have to adopt a similar privilege extending marital privileges to same-sex couples. In this current political landscape of states characterized as red or blue, achieving unanimity on the issue of extending marital privileges to same-sex spouses is unrealistic. The fact that forty-two states have passed legislation or constitutional amendments to prevent recognition of 
B. Court Intervention
That leaves the second option for allowing same-sex partners to fully exercise the benefits associated with marital privileges-intervention by the Supreme Court-as the only viable option for achieving the predictability necessary to resolve the current inequitable application of marital privileges. The Court could rely on any one of a number of arguments to strike both DOMA and mini-DOMAs, including the Equal Protection Clause, 186 the Due Process Clause, 187 or the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
188 Uniformity in the application of marital privileges is not achieved directly, but uniformity in determining the validity of a marriage is, nonetheless, achieved under this option. The privileges could remain as they were under DOMA and mini-DOMAs; the difference would be whether the court finds a valid marriage. In so finding a valid marriage even in the case of a same-sex couple, the privilege would be applied. With that predictability, same-sex partners could then fully exercise the rights and benefits conferred to them by the states celebrating their marriages; they would be free to communicate intimately just like any opposite-sex couple without fear of those communications later being exposed.
Equal Protection Under the Law
The most successful argument challenging same-sex marriage bans post-United States v. Windsor is that such prohibitions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014 ), aff'd, Bostic v. Schaefer, Nos. 14-1167 , 14-1169 , 14-1173 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. Jul. 28, 2014 (finding that Virginia's same-sex marriage ban violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-CV-750-H, 2014 WL 556729, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014 (finding that Kentucky's samesex marriage ban violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Bishop, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1258 (holding that Oklahoma's same-sex marriage ban violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 , 1188 (D. Utah 2013 ), aff'd, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014 191 Where a fundamental right is not affected, but a class-based equal protection challenge is raised, the court must first ask, "whether the challenged state action intentionally discriminates between groups of persons." 192 Where a finding of intentional discrimination is made, a court must then decide whether the state's discriminatory action is justified by some "upright government purpose." 193 Heightened scrutiny of intentional discrimination is warranted where the target of the discrimination is a suspect class. 194 Legislation that targets classifications based on sex or illegitimacy is subject to intermediate scrutiny, which upholds quasi-suspect classifications only where they are "substantially related to an important governmental objective."
195 All other discriminatory laws are subject to the rational basis test. 196 While several courts have insinuated that a heightened level of scrutiny should apply to the issue of same-sex marriage, there is no consensus on that issue currently. 197 Many recent decisions on the matter have, nonetheless, found that same-sex marriage bans do not even satisfy the rational basis test requiring that the state law bear "a rational relationship to some legitimate end." 204 Although the court reasoned (1) that the Supreme Court indicated that heightened review may apply, (2) that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals may also apply a heightened standard of review if asked to revisit the issue, and (3) that it strongly believed sexual orientation could be deemed a suspect class warranting heightened review, it ultimately applied only the rational basis test. 205 Ultimately, the court determined that the proffered purpose for Kentucky's same-sex marriage bans-to preserve the state's institution of traditional marriage-was not a sufficiently legitimate interest to pass constitutional muster under the rational basis test. Id. at 482. "The legitimate purposes proffered by the Proponents for the challenged lawsto promote conformity to the traditions and heritage of a majority of Virginia's citizens, to perpetuate a generally-recognized deference to the state's will pertaining to domestic relations laws, and, finally, to endorse 'responsible reproduction'-share no rational link with Virginia Marriage Laws being challenged. The goal and the result of this legislation is to deprive Virginia's gay and lesbian citizens of the opportunity and right to choose to celebrate, in marriage, a loving, rewarding, monogamous relationship with a partner to whom they are committed for life. These results occur without furthering any legitimate state purpose. " Id. 204. 2014 WL 556729, at (2003)) ("Over the past forty years, the Supreme Court has refused to allow mere tradition to justify marriage statutes that violate individual liberties.").
207. 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 , 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014 ), aff'd, Bishop v. Smith, Nos. 14-5003 & 14-5006, 2014 WL 3537847 (10th Cir. July 18, 2014 . In Bishop, Susan Barton and Gay Phillips, lesbian Oklahoma residents legally married in both Canada and California, sued Sally Howe Smith, Court Clerk for Tulsa Oklahoma, alleging among other things that Oklahoma's mini-DOMA violated their substantive due process rights and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1262. Mary Bishop and Sharon Baldwin, also lesbian Oklahoma residents, alleged similar claims after their application for a marriage license was denied. Id. at 1263. After
The court described the intentional discrimination in Oklahoma's mini-DOMA to be "stark," noting that "[i]ts effect is to prevent every samesex couple in Oklahoma from receiving a marriage license, and no other couple."
208
The court found further evidence of intentional discrimination in the public comments of Oklahoma legislators at the time of the laws passage.
209
After determining that class-based discrimination against same-sex couples was not entitled to heightened scrutiny, 210 the court found that none of the justifications for Oklahoma's mini-DOMA-to promote morality, to encourage responsible procreation, to steer procreative relationships to marriage, to promote the traditional nuclear family, and to maintain the traditional definition of marriage-satisfied the rational basis test.
211
In Kitchen v. Herbert, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah held Utah's mini-DOMA violative of both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 212 The court determined that the right to marry was a fundamental right requiring strict scrutiny.
213 It further found strict scrutiny implicated because Utah's prohibitions on same-sex marriage involved a sex-based classification. 214 Nonetheless, the court ultimately decided the matter by finding that Utah's bans on same-sex marriage failed even the rational basis test.
215
determining that the Barton couple lacked standing to sue the clerk, the court noted that, but for their sexual orientation, the Bishop couple met all the legal requirements for a marriage license in Oklahoma. Id. at 1274 -75. 208. Id. at 1282 his is a classic, class-based equal protection case in which a line was purposefully drawn between two groups of Oklahoma citizens-same-sex couples desiring an Oklahoma marriage license and opposite-sex couples desiring an Oklahoma marriage license. Applying the Equal Protection arguments accepted by several federal courts considering the constitutionality of DOMA and mini-DOMAs post-Windsor to the specific example of same-sex marital privileges leads to the conclusion that those laws allowing states to refuse to recognize valid same-sex marriages celebrated in other states are similarly unconstitutional.
While the right to marry is a fundamental right, 216 and at least a few courts have held the right to marry a person of the same-sex is also a fundamental right, 217 there is little support for an argument that the recognition of a marital privilege is a fundamental right. A marital privilege is just that, a privilege. Thus, one would be hard-pressed to make the argument that heightened scrutiny should apply where a state refuses to apply an otherwise available marital privilege to a same-sex couple because the couple was being denied a fundamental right.
Arguably, however, heightened scrutiny could apply where a state refuses to extend a marital privilege to a same-sex couple on the basis of animus. A few courts considering a similar issue post-Windsor have found that the purpose of DOMA and mini-DOMAs was to intentionally discriminate against a discrete minority. 218 The purpose behind refusing to recognize a marital privilege available to similarly situated oppositesex couples also demonstrates animus. Such animus triggers heightened scrutiny, requiring the proponent of the law to show that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a significant governmental objective. 219 In the case of marital privileges, DOMA and mini-DOMAs fail to survive heightened scrutiny on both fronts. First, many federal courts considering prohibitions on same-sex marriage post-Windsor have found no significant governmental objective related to denying the validity of same-sex marriages. 220 Second, the law is certainly not narrowly tailored to achieve any of those objectives argued in support of mini-DOMAs.
For example, the laws ban recognition of all same-sex marriages; a law narrowly tailored to protect the interests in procreation (a discredited objective) would prohibit same-sex couples from legally adopting children, rather than prevent couples from sharing their lives together. These laws fail under heightened scrutiny.
Nonetheless, many courts considering the validity of mini-DOMAs post-Windsor have applied the rational basis test finding that, even under this test that is most deferential to state law, mini-DOMAs frustrate the Equal Protection Clause. 221 When considering a court's refusal to apply a marital privilege to a same-sex couple validly married in another state, such actions also fail the rational basis test. As noted by so many courts post-Windsor, there is no legitimate purpose for denying the right to marry to same-sex partners; 222 similarly, there is no legitimate purpose for denying marital privileges to validly married same-sex partners when such privileges are available to their opposite-sex counterparts. And, as explained by those courts, there exists no rational relationship between prohibiting same-sex marriage and encouraging procreation, encouraging marriage, or any of the other objectives advanced by defenders of miniDOMAs. 223 Similarly, there is no rational relationship between denying the marital privileges to same-sex spouses and any of those objectives advanced. For these reasons, the denial of marital privileges to same-sex spouses violates their equal protection rights.
Substantive Due Process
Some courts considering the constitutionality of mini-DOMAs postWindsor have found such laws to also violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 224 The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: 221. See, e.g., Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d S. 14, 30 (1903); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) , abrogated on other grounds, Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 352 (1948) Process Clause. 231 The court in Kitchen noted that the right to a samesex marriage was not a new right compared to the right to opposite-sex marriage, just as the United States Supreme Court did not distinguish the right to an interracial marriage from the right to an intraracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia. 232 Finally, a court that has determined that a state law infringes on a fundamental right must apply strict scrutiny to evaluate the constitutionality of the state law. 233 Strict scrutiny requires that such state laws be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 234 In Bostic v. Rainey, the Eastern District of Virginia held that preserving the tradition of opposite sex marriage fails a strict scrutiny or even rational basis analysis.
235
That court also held that the justifications for the prohibition of same-sex marriage relating to federalism 236 and optimal child rearing similarly failed to pass muster under either strict scrutiny or rational basis analysis. 237 In Kitchen v. Herbert, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah found that the purposes behind Utah's same-sex KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 marriage bans fail not only strict scrutiny, but the rational basis test as well.
238
Defining the issue broadly, the denial of a marital privilege to a same-sex couple, although such a privilege would be available to a similarly situated opposite-sex couple, involves the denial of the fundamental right to marry. This would trigger strict scrutiny. 239 However, narrowly defined, the issue involves the denial of a privilegea marital privilege-not a fundamental right. From this perspective, a court would have a more difficult time finding the violation of a fundamental right where a marital privilege is denied. Thus, the denial of marital privileges does not strongly support a finding that miniDOMAs violate the Due Process Clause.
Comity
Interestingly, neither the Supreme Court nor any federal Circuit Court has ever weighed into the debate of whether marriage laws are subject to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 240 The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."
241
The Supreme Court interpreted that clause in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, explaining that without the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the states would be "foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations" of the others; 242 under the clause, it seems, states are required to respect the rights and obligations created under the laws of the others. At least one commentator has suggested "the applicability of full faith and credit to the interstate recognition of marriage seems The federal courts have never weighed in on this issue. 248 The argument in favor of invoking the Full Faith and Credit Clause to strike DOMA § 2, as well as all mini-DOMAs, explains that, unlike workers' compensation laws, drivers' licenses, and fishing licenses, which are all treated as "Acts" not subject to comity principles, 249 marriage licensing involves a fundamental right protected by the U.S. Constitution. 250 The Supreme Court has on many occasions singled out marriage as a distinct and special right. 251 There is no reason to believe that the Court, if given the chance, would not agree that uniformity in marriage is exactly the kind of uniformity the Full Faith and Credit Clause was intended to promote. 252 A lack of uniformity in marriage licensing can have disastrous results. 253 For example, a same-sex couple with joint parenting rights in one state may have those parental rights torn asunder by moving across state lines to a state with a mini-DOMA that invalidates the marriage. 254 One half of a couple seeking a divorce could relocate to a state with a mini-DOMA which would view the marriage as void, even absent a divorce decree. 255 The list of complications goes on and suggests that this lack of uniformity will have disastrous consequences for same-sex couples seeking to relocate-within the state with the mini-DOMA. That state is reaching across its borders to strip citizens from foreign states that do recognize same-sex marriages of their rights. Surely, this is the type of uniformity the Full Faith and Credit Clause was meant to protect. Thus, it should be invoked to challenge the constitutionality of DOMA and mini-DOMAs.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current divide across states over marriage equality results in the unfortunate side-effect of chilling the exercise of benefits associated with marital privileges by married same-sex couples. Specifically, same-sex couples may not fully engage in the intimate and confidential communications associated with marriage under stressful circumstances without the certainty that those confidences will not later be revealed under court order in a foreign jurisdiction which refuses to recognize the marital privilege for a same-sex couple whose marriage the foreign court rules invalid. This reality allows those states with prohibitions on samesex marriage-or mini-DOMAs-to curtail the rights of same-sex couples residing in foreign jurisdictions, frustrating the intent of the jurisdiction granting the couple all the rights and benefits of marriage.
The only way to resolve this inequity in recognition of marital privileges is to provide certainty in marital privileges. Because a uniform marital privilege is not a viable option, the only way to provide such certainty is through court intervention striking § 2 of DOMA and mini-DOMAs as violative of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, respectively. The best arguments for challenging these laws are the Equal Protection and Full Faith and Credit Clauses. Under the Equal Protection Clause, the unequal application of marital privileges to samesex spouses fails the rational basis test. Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, mini-DOMAs deny the comity required by the Constitution.
Court intervention to render DOMA § 2 and mini-DOMAs unconstitutional will require states considering the applicability of marital privileges to find a valid marriage on which to base the privilege, even in the case of a same-sex marriage. Predictability in defining a valid marriage across jurisdictions will provide the certainty needed to encourage same-sex couples to fully exercise the rights and privileges of marriage, including the protection of confidentiality in intimate spousal communications and the freedom from testifying adversely to one's spouse.
